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I. 
When we talk about social memory, we should know that the sociology’s thinking is that social evolu-
tion leads to forgetfulness.1 This is one of the thousands unlikely evidences you have to face when 
working on the theory of society; moreover, this is a way to evaluate how much of this explanation has 
a scientific value in its foundations. At first, it sounds unbelievable that the function of memory may be 
to forget. But if you think about Plato’s point of view about writing, then you will find evidence on how 
communication media, not only writing but also, and even more radically, printing press, help everyone 
to free himself from the heavy training of recollecting, and give this duty to external supports, as paper, 
files or books. As you may know, Plato was absolutely worried about what, in retrospect, we quietly 
deem to be an evolutionary advance, especially about the fact that evolution may have loosen philoso-
phers’ habits up and encourage a fake knowledge based on external sources rather than a real erudition 
based on their souls; nevertheless, Plato implicitly figured out that helping scholars to forget would lead 
to a completely different production and administration of knowledge.2 
Be as it may, social memory will always remain a skill of communication in support of communication. 
When you learn to read or how to use a card index, your memory is not simply exteriorized; as well as, 
within the files of an inventory you will not find the consciousness of its maker. In the same way, while 
being invented writing or printing press are not interiorized by the conscience of the reader. In order to 
better explain such a complex transition we need to think in a more abstract way: interdisciplinary re-
search can help us out, and in details the theoretical biology’s structural coupling concept.3 The latter 
suggests the environmental conditions which make possible the system’s information self-reproduction. 
This means that between system and environment there is no mutual exchange: if the environment does 
not help on reproducing the system’s operations, nor it can inform the system itself. We can figure this 
out thinking about the fact that our conscience cannot express itself in a proper communication – yet, 
we do need conscience to give life to any kind of communication, for example when reading a book. 
Language is what makes these two single systems (conscience and communication) coupling together. 
1 Cf. Luhmann 1997, p. 216. On the phenomenology of forgetting see von Foerster 1948. For a full discussion of social 
memory cf. Esposito 2002. 
2 Plato, Phaedrus, 274 C-E. 
3 Cf. Maturana and Varela 1984/1999. On various sociological uses of this concept see Corsi 2001. 
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As we do for any structural issue, we focus on language when it does not work properly: as long as it 
does, its operating skill goes smoothly on (as well as, when pushing the kick-start of a car, a driver does 
not think that something went wrong with his foot, but with the car engine); the same thing happens to 
librarians when they meet the inventory’s resistance in terms of information, or proper information up-
on the library’s content. The application of archives and card-index leads to a shift of structural cou-
pling: that is to say, its relocation from inner conscience to secondary memory. 
As long as oral communication keeps the primacy of knowledge production and administration, the 
continuation of communication necessarily depends on conscience’s performances: conscience becomes 
a sort of a temporary storage full of files and topics which you can put to use any time you need to.4 The 
discrepancy between conscience and communication is that, as Eric Havelock said, memory is a private 
matter, while language is something we all have in common.5 The result is that, when someone appears 
to speak naturally, he is actually practicing a hard, long-lasting effort in terms of remembering, which 
concept utterly makes artificial the whole speech which at the beginning seemed to be such a natural, 
personal expression of his mind. This is why the practice of remembrance has been an essential part of 
rhetoric until early modernity. Even if, starting from late Middle Ages, advanced techniques of manu-
script reproduction were developed, as well as academic booklets (pecia) which you could buy or rent 
separately, and at the same time sophisticated rules were applied for indexing, knowledge still stays a 
orally managed science (for instance, theological encyclopaedias were structured in quæstiones). 
These are the reasons why conscience is the environmental condition of communication. Communica-
tion is contingent on consciousness in terms of imaging all possibilities of knowledge administration – 
in this very sense social systems are structurally coupled with psychic systems. When scholars started to 
get used to secondary memories such as document archives, card index, or libraries, communication be-
gan to couple with machines6 rather that coupling with conscience; of course, conscience still needed to 
be operating, but the actual knowledge reproduction was now simply due to filing cabinets trigging, and 
exploiting their combinations’ variety. So, conscience had no more reasons to be trained, since you just 
needed to update card holders, and no more reasons left for scholars to make good use of memory, since 
they just had to lose and recombine knowledge in smooth entrances whose cross references made up the 
whole system and its order. 
4 The concept of temporary storage (Zwischenspeicher) has been suggested by Luhmann 1997, p. 217. 
5 Havelock 1986/1995, p. 90. 
6 The concept of ‘machine’ is used here in its cybernetic meaning. The term has even a historical licence. According to 
Morhof (17474, Book III, Ch. XIII, § 53, p. 713) the filing cabinet is a machine for making and collecting excerpts (“ad ex-
cerpendum et colligendum machina”). Cf. on this Cevolini 2006, esp. p. 61. 
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The primary effect of this change in learned communication was that all of a sudden everything could 
basically be forgotten – but at the same time you could now remember many more topics. The archive 
and card index are a sort of forgetting machine with no limits. Every day you have the chance to add 
something new without freezing or weighting your personal memory down.7 Unlike conscience, paper 
is a support you can entrust your memory and it has no natural borders, besides the ones of the box 
where it is stored. This leads many scholars, just a century after the invention of printing, to enthusiasti-
cally organize erudition machines, and universal libraries. 
Structural coupling, however, changed the issues relied on retrieving knowledge. You can remember 
everything if everything can be forgotten, but everyone knows that each time you need to find just 
something, and usually something very little, which is not everything actually available. Selection turns 
now to be an external constraint instead of an inner constraint: earlier, this selection was necessarily as-
cribable to the environment (you could know the existence of many works because they were men-
tioned somewhere – but you could not know if they were still existing and, in that case, where they 
were preserved), now the selection is given to the observer.8 As opposed to the topical storehouse where 
the orator placed the images standing for the things he had to remember, archive imposes some retriev-
ing processes and it produces more conceptual cognitive questions. In the storehouse the orator was able 
to wander as in a real space, searching for icons he had hooked his memories up. Space represented a 
reliable coherence principle, and it could be far and widely explored, as long as it had been well struc-
tured and it had clear boundaries, that is to say, it was an enclosed space. By contrast, archive manifests 
itself as a territory which cannot be explored from inside: its user interacts with it as if it was an in-
transparent system – a black block, as cybernetic would say – letting users legitimately irritate itself, 
and  from whose reactions the user can gain topics in a self-referential way. The right structure for this 
coupling is inventory. It makes possible to combine inner selectivity of the machine with outer selec-
tions of users, that is to say hetero- and self-selection, awaiting for the discover of surprises. After all, it 
would be a nonsense to open a card holder and check all its content: this would bring back to the prob-
lem the use of the card holder originally wanted to work out. 
Digital technologies made this need even sharper: from about half a century they offer storage possibili-
ties (and the possibility to improve these possibilities) like never before. But still, the need to immedi-
ately find what you need with no effort nor vagueness becomes urgent and urgent. Vehicle and infor-
7 So Drexel (1638, p. 100), who admits that, thanks to filing systems, the excerpts taken from readings “in infinitum augeri 
possunt”. 
8 Also in early modern Europe there are many scholars who do not give up hetero-directed selections. A well-known exam-
ple is the struggle between Possevino’s Bibliotheca Selecta and Gesner’s Bibliotheca Universalis – both, we may states to-
day, are failed projects. 
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mation are two sides of the same distinction, and they grow up simultaneously over evolution: the 
crossing of contents’ storage limits brings unlimited problems on data’s output.9 Nowadays we call this 
phenomenon web customization, a concept pointing out the best way to adapt digital memory to users’ 
personal needs, knowing the problem is not in the selection of what deserves to be saved, rather in se-
lecting what, according to user, fits for him well. To make it simple: it does not matter what you put in-
side (the memory), but what you take out of it. And here you have to avoid the frustration coming from 
many issues: too many results, too little time to check all of them out – knowing that time and attention, 
as every cognitive resource, run shortly out. In order to go further in such a complex matter, we need to 
carefully consider what Bush had already focused as the heart of this problem: selection. 
 
II. 
First of all we should stop considering information as something you can give away or carrying. Fol-
lowing the popular second-order cybernetics’ theory, environment is what it is: it does not contain in-
formation.10 By consequence, it is not possible to express an information ontology; in turn, this means 
that an information society is a de-ontologized society. Secondly, in order to create an information, you 
need at least one discrepancy, otherwise there would be nothing you can conceive of as a selection, that 
is to say, as an information.11 Every selection is informational only into the context of a horizon of fur-
ther possibilities which are left out. This means that, increasing possibilities, this is to say the variety of 
references, selectivity of selection increases, and consequently its information value; the minimum of 
varieties is obviously given by two possibilities. In this sense, guessing the sex of someone is easier 
than guessing his name – but also less informational. For the same reason the mathematical theory of 
communication has chosen the logarithm in base two (which is the exponentiation you have to raise 
number two to get the supposed variety) as the rule to measure information.12 And calculations showed 
that it is much more economical to proceed through dichotomies, that is to say through differences, ra-
ther than through units – and this is an essential advantage when variety raises up to huge dimensions. 
For example, if you are searching for an atom inside the universe using an electronic calculator analyz-
9 Historically this became clear as Vannevar Bush (1945/1992; 1969/1987, esp. p. 179ff.) designed Memex. 
10 Cf. von Foerster 1981, p. 257ff. 
11 Cf. Luhmann 2008, esp. p. 116. Probably this is also the reason why binary codes have been so successful in evolutionary 
processes. The advantage is that, through a code, systems can structure the self-reproduction of information without having 
to double their relationship to the environment. It is not the environment that has to be differentiated, besides the system ob-
serves the environment through a difference. 
12 Shannon and Weaver 1949/1971, p. 9ff. and p. 34ff. 
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ing one million elements each second, proceeding by units it would take you many centuries; if you 
proceed by differences (in this or that half of the universe?) it takes just four minutes!13 
One of the nodal points is that variety does not represent an ontological quality and so it is impossible to 
objectify. Variety is not located into the environment, but inside the observing system; finally it is a sys-
temic feature, not an environmental one.14 Increasing the skill of information processing, on equal 
terms, is the result of the system’s complexity increase. So is not just the observer depending on infor-
mation, but first of all the information is now depending on the observer; and this concept makes visible 
how the issue consists in the circle throughout the observer builds autonomously up all information 
from which his decisions depend on. For the same reason the still prevalent formula about the issue 
concerning interaction with secondary memories, ‘information storage and retrieval’, sounds mislead-
ing.15 Information cannot be stored nor memorized. And you cannot retrieve information from an exter-
nal box as from a drawer. In that sentence information is mixed up with information’s vehicle, and all 
different problems they bring to life – technical on the one hand, cognitive on the other hand – have 
been neglected. From one side you need to care about that part of environment which represents the es-
sential condition of the reproduction of communication when this one is coupled with a machine rather 
than with a conscience (if a black out occurs, pc switches off, data are not retrievable and your job 
stops). On the other side, it is all about method, that is to say a communicative solution to solve a com-
municative matter. Even if the machine (archive or filing cabinet) is the same for everyone, each single 
interaction with it can be differently informative, or not informative at all, depending on its user. Actu-
ally, earlier modern libraries’ preceptors were already aware of this matter. 
Johann Heinrich Hottinger, for example, pointed out that a public library should conform to the fact that 
not everyone has the same interests and that not everyone takes an interest about the same topic in the 
same way.16 Paraphrasing this quotation, we can say that public library should treasure everything, in 
light of the fact that not everyone likes the same topics, that is to say selection is possible only if there is 
no selection into the library’s contents (which does not mean this content can be randomly collected). 
This circumstance is totally different from the one of the orator who prepared his storehouse (thesaurus) 
for his personal use. There the room was built on its maker’s nature and needs: the choice of representa-
tive images and their location was highly selective, even if the rules for their construction could be 
13 Cf. Ashby 1956/1971, § 13/20, p. 325f. Probably it is not by chance that as complexity becomes uncontrollable after the 
invention of the printing press, knowledge order and management are entrusted to dichotomic distinctions, as in Ramus’ Dia-
lectics. 
14 Cf. on this Luhmann 2005, p. 38, recalling Ashby’s well-known principle of requisite variety. 
15 Heinz von Foerster (1970, p. 25ff.; 1971, p. 788/2008, p. 84) observed it at beginnings of the 1970s, yet his observation 
went unheeded. 
16 “Qui Bibliothecas usui publico vult inservire, multis se debet accomodare ingenijs. Ut enim aliud placet alij, ita ne Iupiter 
quidem omnibus” (Hottinger 1664, Part I, Ch. V, p. 79). 
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taught as a form of art. To this effect, the storehouse was strongly personalized, even if this did not 
grant the fact that its utilization for mnemonic purposes would be free from inconveniences, as Agustin 
admitted when complaining about the fact that images standing for the things he had to remember did 
not always jump out immediately, and the images jumping out were not always the right ones.17 
Public library is forced to renounce to these idiosyncratic forms and needs to produce highly standard-
ized criteria to organize all its content in view (paradoxically) of a highly personalized interaction of the 
user with his secondary memory. The apparently peculiar aspect of this total change is that everyone 
can retrieve from the library all information needed just because library itself contains no information. 
On the one hand the form of in-transparence you have to deal with is totally changed, on the other hand 
the ways to effectively handle this in-transparence totally changed as well. According to the rhetorician, 
this in-transparence is just a matter of mnemonic hooks and their coherent location inside the rhetorical 
warehouse; according to the library’s user, this in-transparence is the one of a secondary memory which 
let you explore it only from outside, thanks to an inventory which does not follow the inner archive or-
der, nor the order of the universe, and that, for all these reasons, moves the matter of information re-
trieving from a local movement to much more abstract combining operations.18 
To make possible this kind of interaction, we need to conceive memory not just as a simple aggregate of 
records: what is inside memory must be relied to a net of self-referential cross references which make 
possible the information retrieving thanks to connection rules, knowing that what fails to be hooked on 
this net of references (as if it was a book on a shelf of a library which was not listed, or an entry inside 
the filing cabinet which was not numbered) will be necessarily lost and cannot be looked intentionally 
for, nor intentionally recovered.19 The key word spent until early modernity to point this matter out is 
‘order’. 
Hottinger, for example, asks himself what is richness for if you cannot take advantage of it; and not a 
long time after that Daniel Georg Morhof repeats that it has no sense to overstock books if you cannot 
make the most out of their use. After all, Gabriel Naudé was one of the firsts to note that a pile of books 
does not deserve to be called library more than a pile of stones deserves to be called house. According 
to everybody this meant that, as Claude Clément said, order is the soul of library, and this is the reason 
why each single library needed to have its own order.20 The matter is not what you put inside – if it can 
17 Agustin, Conf., X, VIII. 
18 On the transition from the mnemonic pattern of storehouse to the mnemonic pattern of archive see Esposito 2002, p. 161ff. 
and p. 239ff. 
19 Cf. Krippendorff 1975, esp. p. 17. 
20 Cf. Hottinger 1664, Part I, p. 3: “Quod enim fortuna juvat, si non conceditur usus?”; Morhof 17474, T. I, Book I, Ch. V, p. 
34: “Non juvat Thesaurus temere congestus [...]. Non prodest libros cumulare, si illis idonee uti non possumus”; Naudé 
1627/1994, p. 93; Clément 1635, Book II, Section I, p. 286: “Est autem ordo in primis necessarius in Bibliotheca [...], quod 
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contain everything, then everything is equally important, so equally indifferent – but the way you create 
the net of relations that leads to have transparent rules able to face the in-transparence of the system up. 
Setting an inner order is not an easy work and it shows unknown matters which will involve librarians 
starting from 17th Century on. In an intense extract, Hottinger admits that it is much easier to bring 
some categories from a book out in a methodic way, rather than placing books inside an ordered catego-
ry method: this is, according to Hottinger words, an arduous matter (tractatio difficilis); cataloguing 
(collocatio) cannot be just a matter of taste, but it has to consider usefulness as well, knowing that, de-
pending on this achievement, it would avoid a huge loss of time or it would lead to a huge loss of 
memory instead.21 
As these worries show, in the middle of 17th Century was already clear that ‘order’ means ‘inventory’, 
and that cataloguing is a sort of remembrance, as suggested by Conrad Gesner in the previous century.22 
But what makes Hottinger’s statement such an arduous matter is that the relational structure of semantic 
connections of the archive and the one of its user do not match. If it was not so, it would not be so diffi-
cult to find the right place for a book, if into that book a methodical reader could easily find the places 
where to retrieve all topics needed. As well as card index, libraries and archives are not just doubles of 
someone’s personal memory: they do not act as a supporting memory, but as real, proper, secondary 
memories.23 They are, in fact, observation systems, and each user (each observer) faces them up as if 
they were a black box reacting to each irritation in a selective way, relied to the inner order (which is in-
transparent according to user) of the box. This in-transparence represents the real cognitive advantage 
of memory, not an obstacle to be passed by: it guarantees the surprising functioning of memory, and 
someway adds interest to interaction in benefit of user, who finally can gain something out of memory. 
But to get this effect, as Nikas Luhmann said, you have to overpass a ‘systemic boundary’ – the one iso-
lating user from secondary memory as independent observing systems.24 To overpass this boundary a 
long-lasting abstraction and generalization activities are needed, and this is probably the less obvious 
clue of interaction. It is not simply the fact of facing the language of cataloguing or the table of con-
tents’ criteria, which are, as everybody knows, quite hard and do not match with everyday language, but 
ipsa quodammodo Bibliothecæ anima sit, ordo, & conveniens collocatio singularum rerum, quæ sunt huius loci propriæ”; 
Morhof 17474, T. I, Book I, Ch. V, p. 34: “Nulla sine ordine Bibliotheca est, aut esse debet”. 
21 “Facilius enim est ex libris suo loco constitutis, quod placet methodicè eruere, quam unicuique locum suum, ut placeat et 
prosit etiam (collocatio enim memoriæ magnum est vel compendium vel dispendium) ordinare” (Hottinger 1664, Part I, Ch. 
V, p. 79, italics added). 
22 “Nullus à me scriptor contemptus est, non tam quod omnes catalogo aut memoria dignos existimarem, quam ut instituto 
meo satisfacerem, quo mihi imperaveram sine delectu simpliciter omnia quæ incidissent commemorare” (Gesner 1545, Epi-
stola nuncupatoria, s.n. sed 3v). 
23 On the distinction between supporting/secondary memory see Luhmann 1992b, esp. p. 66. 
24 Cf. Luhmann 1992a/2006, p. 422. 
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– in a further more radical way – what you gain as an individual experience, is to translate a completely 
different semantic associations’ development. In light of this, the recently seen Picasso’s exhibition 
does not take the same name of the painter inside the card holder, but it can cross reference with entries 
as ‘art’ or ‘museum/exhibition’, and then lead by connections to further time categories as ‘temporari-
ness’ (exhibition are crowded while museums are empty because in modern society we prefer the things 
that pass by), or social, as ‘crowd’, ‘imitation’, and so on.25 User simply triggers the net of inner con-
nections of the card file, to see if and how it reacts. The effect is a sort of ‘horizon substitution’: the 
same topic is matched with a different variety compared with the user’s one, and in this way it leads to 
many unexpected research paths. Interaction triggers, in other terms, selections and connections which 
were not yet, or not at all, conceived, and this brings a surprise effect that simple personal experience 
could never bring out.26 
As soon as it is triggered, card file actually reacts to itself. Machine’s reaction to user is mediate by ma-
chine’s reaction to itself, and this is coherent with the fact that in every communication hetero-reference 
gets through self-reference of the system. Self-reaction is the combination of self-resistance and con-
necting skills. On the one hand card index is obviously limited by itself – by both what is inside and 
outside of it –, on the other hand, once triggered, it can lead not only to connections but also to further 
connections’ possibilities. In this sense it acts like a real and proper autopoietic system, able to create 
connections throughout the creation of connections. This makes card index a real heavy machine. Each 
time the user gives a topic to card index, it is no more a user’s thought, but a card index’s thought. Sec-
ondary memory does not actually act like another ego you can ask for help when your ego, let us say, 
jams, but like an alter ego. And interaction with it does not occur as a soliloquy, but as a real communi-
cation process. 
 
III. 
As we said, one of the crucial points in the process of interaction with secondary memories, is to go 
through systemic boundary. Taking care of this boundary generates different issues, which are generally 
referring to cataloguing rules. Librarian has first of all to distinguish the book from the topics the book 
is about, knowing that they hardly ever correspond: the title is about garlic, the book talks about on-
25 This example is suggested by Luhmann 1992a/2006, p. 422f. 
26 Early modern inventors of filing rules and systems were well aware of it. According to Meiners (1791, p. 91f.), for in-
stance, every connection between entries allows combinations and observations which otherwise nobody had come to by 
himself («Selbst die Vereinigung von so vielen Factis und Gedanken, als man in vollständigen Excerpten zusammengebracht 
hat, veranlaßt eine Menge von Combinationen und Aussichten, die man sonst niemahls gemacht, oder erhalten hätte»). 
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ions.27 Cataloguing is a matter of categories and being so, it requires a lot of care. In order to raise the 
possibilities to retrieve the book up, the suggestion given from the beginning is to increase the number 
of inventories and at the same time to mutually connect them. Modern librarian has to be able to easily 
move between varietas catalogarum and ratio contexendi catalogos. In addition to all this, there is an 
usual multiple storage issue: the same content can be catalogued under different categories; as they said 
from 16th Century, not just the name, but even the topic it refers to is common to many commonplaces, 
that is to say it can be assigned to many different subjects. Anger is a theological as a psychological 
subject, but also a medical and moral one – and historians have many prime examples concerning the 
effects anger has upon action.28 How can we guide researcher to what he is searching for, if we cannot 
take for granted that he already knows where to find it? In this case, increasing the number of invento-
ries in not enough: we would better increase the number of cross references in order to create a denser 
net of connections which build secondary memory’s structure up. The advantage of all this is that we 
will have many more researching paths bringing us to the same topic, starting from different entries, or, 
vice-versa, more researching paths able to generate different topics starting from the same entry. 
This kind of projects started in middle 20th Century and are based on digital memories’ support. Memex 
program’s final goal, for example, was to overtake traditional archive retrieving limits, starting from in-
ventories’ language artificiality and the usual need to follow forced paths in order to retrieve some spe-
cific contents. The idea was that, if we could give a cataloguing scheme up and change the table of con-
tents with a grid of cross references you could endless increase, we would enormously increase the ex-
ploration potential of the archive, and consequentially its contents’ memorability. To reach this goal we 
therefore needed to stop considering knowledge as something laying in a concrete object such as a 
book. The transition from retrieving knowledge through index to retrieving knowledge through crossing 
references, in different words, involved the transition from text to hypertext, from the retrieving of a 
completed document to interactive construction of a new one, opened to any new connection.29 
From Memex on, everybody admitted that a memory preserving connection more than preserving doc-
uments (i.e. records) shows many advantages. From the machine’s side, building up a system working 
through connections rather than keeping results is much economical – this is evidently showed in calcu-
lators machines. Moreover, semantic connection’s rules can be mechanically followed, through algo-
27 So Hottinger 1664, Part I, Ch. VII, p. 118. Heinz von Foerster (1971/2008, p. 81) raises the same issue as he observes that 
the term quantum does not appear in the title, nor in the text of Max Planck’s publications, although the German physician is 
the father of quantum theory. 
28 Cf. Gesner 1548, Book I, Tit. XIII, § 4, col. 23c: “[...] Non solum nomen diversis communibus locis commune [est], sed 
etiam subjectum” (italics added). 
29 Bush (1969/1987, p. 180) had already spoken of the primacy of selection by association over selection by indexing. This 
idea has been further developed in modern designs for the construction of structural memories and hypertexts. Cf. Krippen-
dorff 1975, p. 28ff.; Landow 1994/1998; Esposito 2001, p. 224f. 
 9 
                                                 
rithms, so the user is no more forced to hardly acquire familiarity with cross references’ rules.  From the 
user’s side, besides, the advantage is firstly that he does not need to learn the language of indexing sys-
tem’s programmer; secondly, rather than be tighten in forced paths, the user can explore memory as if it 
was an out-and-out labyrinth, coordinating from time to time his selections with machine’s selections 
and accepting or refusing the results according to his needs. Working through connections the machine, 
so to say, artificially reproduces natural memory, and gives evidence to the fact that, as allowed by ex-
perimental psychology, remembering does not mean retrieving something, but continuously re-building 
the past in a selective way.30 
Secondary memories’ potential is not limited to this issue, anyway. Interaction between machine and 
user has the shape of a real cybernetic circuit, so that not only user learns from the machine, but also 
machine learns from user. In other words, interaction coincides to a learning system and this is what 
makes archives and card index being an unpredictable historical machine. The machine is ‘historical’ in 
two ways: on the one hand it obviously is the final product of the reading and researching interests of 
the scientist who took care of it (especially if the up-quoted machine is a card index). On the other hand 
the purpose of the machine was, from the early beginning, to capitalize on users’ irritations result, to en-
rich and update itself in view of further irritations. In cybernetic terms, we could say outputs come into 
the machine as inputs, and this leads not only to an increase of topics, and so an extension of the con-
tainer, but also, and even more radically, to an increase of connections, which means an extension of the 
whole system’s inner structure. 
The consequence is that machine never behaves in a trivial way: the same input (or irritation) does not 
always match with the same output (reaction), because in the meantime the net of the system’s inner 
connections has changed, enriched, opening new researching paths and new possibilities of comparisons 
and combinations. To make an example we already made: we start from Picasso, we approach on ‘art’, 
‘exhibition’ and ‘museum’, but now the cross reference leads to ‘market’ (exhibition are made to sell 
major works, museum are made to treasure them), and this opens unexpected perspectives, as the pecu-
liar fact that major works are usually expensive, but you cannot say that a work is a major work just be-
cause someone would expensively pay for it. Machine continues working in a deterministic way, which 
is evident especially when cross references’ rules are automatically accomplished through algorithms, 
but the link between input and output is no more invariant, but variable, and this is what makes histori-
cal machine an unpredictable partner – right because its reactions depend on the past.31 
 
30 Cf. just Staub 2006, with extensive bibliography. 
31 On the distinction between trivial and historical machine cf. von Foerster 1971, esp. p. 793; 1985, esp. p. 131. 
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IV. 
The big advantage of secondary memories able to capitalize results of executed deductions to enlarge 
their net of cross references and inner connection, is that the potential of inductions’ performing in-
creases. In fact, memory was made to create inferences. Almost half a Century ago Heinz von Foerster 
predicted that the questions users would have asked to libraries, would have been a sort of riddles or 
logical puzzle.32 And when they asked him whether technology was already able to answer logical puz-
zle, Foerster said yes. In fact, Paul Weston had just realized a program able to make deductions activat-
ing the inner system’s semantic cross references, or exploring unexpected paths of research and exclud-
ing contradictory conclusions step by step: the program started with a limited number of information 
(all riddles are founded on an incomplete sentence as a start) divided into classes of elements and clas-
ses of connections. The result of these explorations would have been then fixed by the machine as new 
semantic references which could currently be activated, until it completed all deductions the riddle re-
quired. 
If we generalize the experience made with Weston’s HIRWON program, we can say that the two prin-
ciples inspiring cognitive memories are semantic computation and user’s adaptability. In the first case it 
is all about trigging the net of self-referential cross references which build the structure of the system 
up, through irritation, and see how the machine reacts. Cross references allows to economically solve 
the multiple storage issue, but it then creates different ones, for example semantic ambiguity (if you 
search ‘tigers’, are you searching for a class of animal or for a baseball team?). In the second case the 
idea that interaction between user and machine is informational for both of them, and out of this interac-
tion machine could count on previous researches to fix cross references which could better fit interests 
and relevance criteria of who interacted with secondary memory, settled in. In consequence, user is not 
adapting to web, but web instead is adapting to user. 
In many works about digital memories’ utilization, this concept is called user profile or user centered 
information retrieval.33 Each research leaves a mark that memory fixes as a connection which can be 
proposed again in further researches in order to enlarge not only the selections possible, but mostly, the 
results’ selectivity. In some way the concept is: tell me what are you searching for and I will tell you 
who you are. On the one hand, informatics solutions have been increased in order to accomplish an on-
tology-based information retrieval – which is a doubtable definition of the procedure that consists in 
creating a hierarchy of controlled categories where the contents the user wants to check out can be 
32 Cf. von Foerster 1971/2008, p. 87ff. for a short and clear description of HIRWON program invented by Paul Weston 
1970, p. 77ff. On this topical subject see also Cevolini 2008, p. 73ff. 
33 Cf. for instance Gauch et al. 2003; Ranwez et al. 2012, with extensive bibliography. 
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hooked to, creating favorite paths of semantic associations which should make acknowledgement more 
effective. On the other hand, they try to achieve that the user himself, with his behaviour and naviga-
tion, create these grids, giving the machine rules in order to automatically evaluate the percentage of in-
terest the user has for the retrieved material.34 
The use of algorithm makes possible for the system to register if, and in which measure, previous con-
nections are existing inside the web, without any pre-ordered classification of concepts which have any 
semantic similitude in common. The pre-existing semantic connections will become constraints to se-
lect further connections, making the research contingent but not arbitrary.35 At the end, the user does 
not just train the machine to solve logical puzzles, but, thanks to his navigating behaviour, builds all in-
formation needed up to produce logical puzzles. In other words: user’s research behaviour actually is 
the riddle which he asks the machine to solve. In this sense, user’s adaptability skill becomes primary to 
semantic computation, and every classification ends to be the after-coming result, not the prior require-
ment of information research. From a librarianship point of view, these innovations’ first consequence 
is that researching results are no more produced by the catalogue, besides the catalogue itself is the 
product of research. If interaction goes on, this relation becomes circular as for each cybernetic relation, 
and the user finds himself staring not just an objectively available knowledge, but the way in which ob-
servers who switched the machine on are observing available knowledge. In different terms, the link is 
not dictated by reality, but by observers’ observations. The paradox is that algorithm-made selection 
brings back the variety which the solution wanted to solve. 
If we come back to the principle of discrepancy from which the informational value of an information 
depends on, we could honestly suggest a more economical way to interact with secondary memories. 
While admittedly that variety you have to face would have reach huge dimensions – e.g. the research of 
an atom inside the Universe – an enough powerful machine could easily find out an element dividing 
the above-quoted universe in a dichotomic way. In fact, historiography has long showed that ideas do 
not evolve separately, but thanks to anti-concepts, that is to say antinomies.36 When an anti-concept 
changes or it is replaced, the change involves not only what is on the other side of the distinction, but 
also the whole distinction, meant as unity of the difference, cross references’ horizon. To make it short-
er, we could say that when the solution changes, the problem it refers to changes as well. So, just like 
the difference between virtue and fortune connotes the moral code of aristocracy to separate from work-
ing classes, imaging action’s possibilities which can underline its magnificence, the difference between 
34 Cf. Gauch et al. 2003, esp. p. 222ff. 
35 Cf. Esposito 2014, esp. p. 240. 
36 Cf. Koselleck 1979/1986, p. 181ff. 
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risk and fortune connotes the worries of mercantile class when coping with decisional processes’ uncer-
tainty. A catalogue considering these issues could avoid, for the user, to search the information he needs 
in the, let’s say, wrong half-part of the universe, suggesting anyway unexpected search paths, e.g. the 
fact that the word risicum is a late-Medieval neologism which has for some times competed against no-
bles’ virtue as an anti-concept of fortuna, but which, in comparison with the second one, will later have 
an evolving success which still has to be sufficiently explained by historical-social sciences. If the struc-
tural coupling between user and machine would achieved to trigger this kind of irritation conditions, 
cognitive potential of interactive search would increase without giving digital memories potential away. 
(English translation by Silvia Misley) 
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